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On 
27 May 2010, with crude oil gushing into the Gulf of 
Mexico after the explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig, the Obama administration announced it 
would pause offshore drilling plans in the Arctic Ocean, one of the 
planet’s most pristine eco  systems.1 Hailed by environmental groups, 
the decision was a major setback to the oil industry, which was gearing 
up to tap what’s expected to be vast amounts of oil and gas lying under 
the Arctic’s treacherous waters, wher e sustained winds blow at 30 to 50 
miles per hour, and menacing chunks of floating “pack ice,” some hun-
dreds of feet wide and dozens of feet thick, threaten marine traffic. 
With shallow-water, near-shore reserves increasingly tapped out in 
the Gulf of Mexico, oil companies are being forced into more challeng-
ing terrain to sustain domestic energy production. That means pushing 
into much deeper geology in the Gulf of Mexico—much of it more 
than a mile underwater—and also into ecologically fragile locations off 
the coast of Alaska. 
In decades past, oil companies didn’t prioritize the offshore Arctic 
for development because drilling there was too expensive. Oil prices 
simply weren’t high enough to sustain production windows limited to 
just a few months in summer, when thawing seas make drilling pos-
sible, explains Layla Hughes, an attorney and senior program officer 
for Arctic oil, gas, and shipping policy at the WWF in Juneau. But as 
economies in China, India, and Brazil have grown, global fuel demands 
have risen accordingly,2 driving prices higher and making offshore 
Arctic development economically viable. “Prices started going up in the 
late nineties, and they’re projected to stay high,” Hughes says. 
Oil companies now have to prove they can extract those resources 
safely, without compromising an ecosystem that might never recover 
from the effects of a large blowout. Dana Wetzel, an ecotoxicologist 
at Mote Marine Laboratory with 10 years’ research experience in the 
Arctic, says oil degradation depends largely on temperature. When 
exposed to frigid water, oil turns quickly into a thick, tarry substance 
that microbes can’t easily degrade. 
The 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, which occurred roughly 400 miles 
south of the Arctic Circle, likely under  estimates the full environmental 
impact of a blowout even farther to the north. “The Valdez was a hor-
rible spill in a rich marine ecosystem, but you didn’t have the oiling 
of the sea ice,” Wetzel says. “If you taint sea ice with oil, you’re never 
going to get rid of it. And those ice floes are home to walruses, seals, 
and polar bears. Many people survive up there by subsistence hunting, 
and to contaminate their food is one of the worst moral blows you can 
deliver to those communities.”
3 
Exploration Interrupted
The Alaska Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), a swath of submerged ter-
ritory under U.S. federal control—contains an estimated 23% of the 
nation’s technically recoverable4 oil (26.65 billion barrels) and 21% of 
total technically recoverable natural gas (132.06 trillion ft3), accord-
ing to the most recent comprehensive assessment by the U.S. Minerals 
Management Service (MMS),5 which in June 2010 was reorganized 
and given a new name: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement, or BOEMRE.6 These projected 
resources were calculated based on assumptions about the nature 
and extent of geological formations in the area, according to Richard 
Ranger, senior policy advisor at the American Petroleum Institute 
in Washington, DC. If borne out by exploratory drilling—which 
would confirm estimated oil volumes and their projected financial 
value—these estimates put the Alaska OCS second only to the Gulf 
of Mexico in terms of future domestic yield. 
The federal government manages OCS oil and gas resources off 
Alaska and also off the Gulf of Mexico and along the Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts using a multistage process. The Department of the 
Interior first decides which areas are available for drilling, and then 
it sells leasing rights to those areas to the highest bidder. With Lease 
Sale 193, Royal Dutch Shell, PLC, which is the only company that 
was prepared to drill this year in the Alaska OCS, paid $2.2 bil-
lion for the rights to explore in the Chukchi Sea, which lies west of 
Barrow, the state’s northernmost city.7 
That 2008 purchase allowed Shell to use seismic technology 
to conduct geophysical searches for oil and gas in the Chukchi 
and also to submit an exploration plan detailing how the company 
would drill wells to confirm if petroleum was present in suspected 
locations. What was then the MMS reviewed Shell’s exploration 
plan and in December 2009 gave the company the green light for 
three explor  atory wells in the Chukchi and two more in the adjoin-
ing Beaufort Sea to the east of Barrow, where Shell had purchased 
exploration rights in a prior lease sale, according to Shell spokesman 
Curtis Smith. 
But after the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on April 20, off-
shore operations throughout U.S. waters came under intense scrutiny. 
Prior to that disaster, both oil companies and the MMS could pro-
mote Arctic development on the basis of what they each claimed was 
a history of safe drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The MMS deemed 
the likelihood of an Arctic blowout remote on the basis of its own 
research showing that “four wells out of fourteen thousand studied 
[in the Gulf] had undergone a blowout scenario, with the largest 
incident releasing some two hundred barrels of oil,” says BOEMRE 
spokesman John Callahan. 
Whether the estimated 4.9 million barrels (205.8 million gallons) 
of oil released during the recent Gulf spill8 supersedes that safety 
record is debatable. What is clear, however, is that the spill created 
new anxieties about drilling in the offshore Arctic, where pack ice, 
storms, and intense winter cold could severely hamper efforts to con-
tain a potential blowout. 
On May 27, just as a month-long moratorium on drilling was set 
to expire, the administration extended it for deepwater operations in 
the Gulf of Mexico for an additional six months, claiming the pause 
was necessary to ensure oil companies working at extreme depths had 
adequate spill prevention and response capabilities.1 The administra-
tion also announced that applications for permits to drill in the Alaska 
OCS wouldn’t be considered until 2011 at the earliest. “[Applications 
for permits to drill] are the final approval necessary before drilling can 
occur under a previously approved exploration plan,” explains Peter 
Van Tuyn, an environmental lawyer based in Anchorage, who repre-
sents conservation groups and local indigenous populations. 
After the federal suspension, Shell’s exploration plans took another 
hit on July 21, when the Alaska Federal District Court ruled the 
MMS hadn’t sufficiently considered environmental threats posed by 
drilling activities associated with Lease Sale 193.9 Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the MMS is required to conduct an
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environmental impact statement for each 
of its OCS lease sales. But siding with the 
Native Village of Point Hope, a tribal gov-
ernment residing on the Chukchi coast, in its 
litigation against Interior secretary Kenneth 
Salazar, the court held that in the case of 
Lease Sale 193 the agency’s environmental 
impact statement had failed to analyze the 
potential impacts of natural gas develop-
ment (it had addressed only oil development. 
It also had failed to determine if “missing 
scientific information” (relating mainly to 
polar bear and walrus ecology, Van Tuyn 
says) was “relevant or essential” to protecting 
natural resources from drilling operations. 
The court therefore issued a cease-and-desist 
order against all pending activities under 
the lease sale, effectively blocking Shell from 
drilling in the Chukchi until BOEMRE 
revises its environmental assessment.
Smith admits these setbacks create uncer-
tainty for the company, which he says has 
$3.5 billion invested toward its OCS opera-
tions in Alaska, including not just the value 
of its lease purchase but also oil spill response 
infrastructure, operational readiness, seismic 
investigations, and research. “We’re unsure 
how [the July 21 decision] might impact 
our aspirations to drill in 2011,” Smith says. 
“While the ruling is disappointing, the judge 
did not vacate the lease sale, and his specific 
concerns can be remedied expeditiously pro-
vided the BOEMRE completes the work in 
question.” In response, Callahan would say 
only that the agency is reviewing the Alaska 
court’s decision carefully and deciding how 
best to comply with it. 
The Argument for Drilling
Chuck Clusen, director of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council’s Alaska project, 
describes Shell as the biggest offshore opera-
tor in the area by far. “Shell’s at the leading 
edge, and the other companies are hanging 
back waiting for it to start so they can see what 
happens and then act on their own,” he says. 
Other companies with preliminary operations 
in the Alaska OCS include Chevron, Conoco 
Philips, Statoil (a Norwegian company), 
ExxonMobil, and BP, according to Ranger. 
BP has spent over a decade developing 
its controversial Liberty Project, which aims 
to extract 100 million barrels of oil from 
under the Beaufort Sea. The company was 
planning to access the oil with an “extended 
reach” horizontal well, drilled from a gravel 
island built three miles offshore in Prudhoe 
Bay. Digging first two miles down, and then 
six to eight miles out horizontally to the oil 
reservoir, this would be the longest extended-
reach well ever created, Ranger says. 
Yet in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, BP’s offshore plans in Alaska appear 
to be on hold. The company has yet to sub-
mit an application for a permit to drill in the 
Beaufort Sea, Callahan says, and according 
to Ranger, BP has indicated it is likely to 
delay the project.
As offshore Arctic drilling waits to go 
forward, the essential question is whether 
it can be done safely. The petroleum indus-
try insists the answer is yes. Ranger claims 
drilling depths currently being considered 
in the U.S. Arctic don’t exceed 500 feet, 
unlike the 5,000 depths or more in the Gulf 
of Mexico. Moreover, oil flows are much less 
pressurized in the region, he says. While the 
Macondo Prospect (the geological site of the 
Deepwater Horizon rig) gushes oil at a flow 
rate of 15,000 psi, Smith says historical data 
put expected flow rates in the Alaska OCS 
at a much lower 6,000 psi. That figure—
produced by Shell during prior exploratory 
drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, 
according to Smith—has not been confirmed 
by external experts, and Callahan did not 
respond to inquiries about external review of 
Shell’s wellhead pressure estimate.
Nevertheless, lower pressure is held up 
as a key argument for the safety of Arctic 
drilling. According to Ranger, companies 
studying potential projects in the U.S. Arctic 
believe shallow waters will make it easier 
for divers and submersibles to respond to 
a potential blowout, while lower pressures 
will make a blowout less likely overall. In 
a May 14 letter to former MMS director 
S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Shell’s president, 
Marvin Odum, took a similar stand. “Due 
to the difference in expected down-hole pres-
sure of the Macondo well versus our planned 
2010 wells, our margin to safely operate in 
Alaska is much greater than that experienced 
by Deepwater Horizon,” he wrote.10 
In the letter, Odum argued that drilling 
muds—slurries of clay and other minerals 
mixed with water or oil that modulate oil 
flows in the pipe connecting the wellhead at 
the seafloor to the drill rig at the surface—
would be heavy enough to contain a low-
pressure blowout. He also referenced other 
safety features such as cement liners that 
strengthen the casing pipe, which extends 
downward from the wellhead to the oil reser-
voir deep underground. A series of intercon-
nected pipes, the casing is analogous to a 
telescope, with a wide end at the surface that 
narrows as each additional pipe goes through 
the bore, penetrating into the geology below. 
Each pipe is secured with cement, Ranger 
explains, and that’s what ensures the integrity 
of the well (indeed, an inadequate cement job 
compromised by skimping on costs was one 
of the fatal flaws of the destroyed BP well11). 
Still, Ranger admits responders would 
have a limited ability to contain a blowout 
should it occur. “The laws of physics and 
chemistry make it very difficult to remove one 
liquid, in this case oil, from another, meaning 
water,” he says. “All on-water oil-spill response 
is imperfect, and our ability to recover oil 
mechanically ranges from ten percent to thir-
ty percent. Those are the realities.” 
Breaking Down the  
Response Plan
Arctic drilling is only viable, Hughes says, 
from July through late September or October. 
Each year the sea ice first starts separating 
from shore in April, creating a steadily widen-
ing stretch of open water called a lead. By July, 
open water dominates in the region, although 
portions still freeze over occasionally, and pack 
ice can still threaten drilling operations. Come 
November, the region has completely refrozen.
In a worst-case scenario, a blowout would 
occur in late fall, producing an oil gusher 
blocked at the surface by newly formed 
ice, says Rick Steiner, a professor of marine 
conservation at the University of Alaska in 
The International Component
Offshore Arctic development also has an international component, given that seven circumpolar 
nations—the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, Greenland, Iceland, and Sweden—have 
claims to submerged territory in the region that could hold as much as of 25% of the world’s 
remaining petroleum reserves. In one closely watched operation, the Scottish company Cairn 
Energy is drilling exploration wells in the Davis Straits, an icy stretch between Greenland and 
Baffin Island. Statoil already drills for natural gas now in the Barents Sea at a point roughly 
90 miles northwest of Hammerfest, Norway. 
Patrick Lewis of the WWF International Arctic Programme says very little of the accessible 
Arctic sea floor is unclaimed by one country or another. “And there’s a complete absence of 
international regulation over the oil and gas industries,” he says. “While other global sectors, 
such as shipping, are regulated at the international level, the petroleum sector still depends 
on [national-level] regulation, which is frequently inconsistent across regions and poorly 
administered.” 
Therefore, oil companies may choose to operate in areas where rules governing environ  mental safety—
or enforcement of those rules—is more lax. “Unfortunately,” Lewis says, “the consequences of a 
major spill may well affect more than just one jurisdiction.”Anchorage. Inaccessible to skimmers, booms, 
and other mechanical recovery tools, oil would 
flow under the frozen surface and spread 
throughout the region. “There would be noth-
ing you could do about it until the ice goes 
out again in June,” Steiner emphasizes. “The 
oil would be in evidence for decades. It could 
fundamentally restructure the Arctic Ocean 
ecosystem, which is already threatened by 
damage from climate change.” 
Smith says that in the event of a major 
spill, the company would deploy its “world-
class, on-site oil-response kit,” which includes 
booms, skimmers, helicopters, support vessels, 
and other infrastructure, all floating next to 
the drill site and ready for mobilization within 
an hour. He also claims Shell could drill a 
relief well within 30 days using an “ice-ready” 
drill rig that can work late into the winter sea-
son. The spill response plan has been reviewed 
and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, Smith 
says. “We’re also at pre-engineering stages on a 
containment dome developed specifically for 
Arctic conditions,” he adds. 
Yet in a blog posting dated May 26, 
Clusen wrote that Shell offers no explanation 
for why such a dome would be more successful 
than the one that failed in the Gulf. “Although 
much shallower, the [proposed] wells in the 
Arctic are sufficiently cold to produce the 
methane hydrate crystals that formed in the 
Gulf and clogged the hole at the top through 
which the oil was supposed to be removed by 
a pipe to the sea surface,” he wrote.12 
Moreover, Hughes disputes the notion 
that a relief well could be drilled in less than 
30 days, and claims current efforts to drill 
such wells at the Macondo Prospect—in their 
105th day at the time of this writing—bolster 
her case. Patrick Lewis, officer for responsible 
industry at the WWF’s International Arctic 
Programme in Oslo, Norway, adds there’s 
no way the Alaskan infrastructure could 
handle a large offshore spill response. Where 
the Deepwater Horizon response at one point 
involved more than 5,300 vessels, 120 aircraft, 
4.27 million feet of boom, 1.8 million gal-
lons of dispersant, and 42,000 people,13 all 
deployed from a highly developed coastline, 
the Chukchi and Beaufort coastlines contain 
no road system, essentially no port facilities, 
and few airports. In his May 26 blog entry, 
Clusen wrote that the nearest airports are in 
Barrow and Point Hope (100 and 150 miles, 
respectively, from Shell’s proposed drill sites); 
the nearest U.S. Coast Guard station is in 
Kodiak, 1,000 miles away.12 
Moreover, it’s unlikely that chemical dis-
persants used to break oil into minute par-
ticles that undergo more rapid microbial deg-
radation underwater would be as effective in 
the Alaska OCS as they were in the Gulf of 
Mexico, according to Carys Mitchelmore, 
an associate professor at the University of 
Maryland’s Chesapeake Biological Laboratory. 
How well dispersants work depends in part 
on temperature, she says, such that applica-
tions would be more effective at the wellhead, 
where spewing oil is hot. But after bubbling 
just a few meters toward the surface in frigid 
water, oil thickens into a more viscous form 
that doesn’t respond to dispersants as readily 
as more fluid oil. 
In Steiner’s view, Shell and the other 
companies proposing to work in the offshore 
Arctic need to develop better blowout risk 
assessments, prevention plans, and response 
measures, reviewed not just by BOEMRE but 
also by other independent bodies such as the 
National Academy of Sciences or the National 
Academy of Engineering. “The companies 
just haven’t gone through the hundred-and-
one ways a blowout could occur, and in my 
opinion, they haven’t sufficiently articulated 
their plans for drilling relief wells,” he says. 
Callahan responds, “The Alaska Region 
[of BOEMRE] can confirm that it reviewed 
Shell’s contingency plan and found it ade-
quate for the time it was issued. However, in 
light of the BP oil spill in the Gulf and new 
requirements for the plans, we will be review-
ing the adequacy of the current version of the 
project’s spill plan.”  
Asked about the impact of the Gulf spill 
on BOEMRE policies with respect to Arctic 
drilling, Callahan says, “We must raise the 
bar for offshore oil and gas operations . . . 
holding them to the highest safety standards 
to ensure they follow the law rather than cut 
corners. The stronger regulatory structure, 
tougher safety requirements, and new leader-
ship we are putting in place will bring about 
fundamental changes to how our nation over-
sees oil and gas operations.”
Choosing a Future
Environmentalists interviewed for this story 
seem resigned to the notion that drilling 
on the Alaska OCS is likely at some point. 
“There’s a lot of oil up there, and the state of 
Alaska desperately wants to go forward on 
this,” Clusen says. Opinions among native 
groups are divided, adds Jonny Jemming, 
a Barrow lawyer who represents the North 
Slope Borough, an Inupiat-led municipal 
government in northern Alaska. Although 
many Inupiat, or native people of Alaska, rely 
in large part on marine subsistence for their 
dietary needs, their native corporations are 
also heavily contracted with oil industries in 
the Alaska OCS, he says. 
Jemming says it’s not fair to say that all 
Inupiat are against offshore drilling. “There’s 
a realization that these decisions are ultimately 
made far outside our control,” he says. “Oil 
operations are part of the socioeconomic 
health of the region. But from what we have 
seen, the technologies for oil spill mitigation 
aren’t adequate to minimize the risk from 
these operations. What we have been asking 
for are the highest safety standards possible 
and that they be implemented before develop-
ment takes place. We see this as reasonable 
ocean management.” 
Still, that raises a difficult question: What 
would an offshore drilling plan in the Arctic 
need to demonstrate before it’s seen as reason-
able? The only logical conclusion is that it 
would show either that a blowout would never 
occur or that it wouldn’t pose an unacceptable 
risk to the region’s fragile ecology. That sets 
a high bar, and the oil industry will have to 
show it can meet it. 
Steiner adds that although offshore drilling 
has broad support in Alaska, the decision to go 
forward with it involves fundamental choices 
for society. “Do we continue our devastat-
ing industrial expansion into one of the last, 
pristine wild areas in the world, extract and 
use the billions of tons of fossil carbon energy 
there, and further degrade the environment of 
the region and the world?” he asks. “Or do we 
choose another, sustainable future?”
Charles W. Schmidt, MS, an award-winning science writer 
from Portland, ME, has written for Discover Magazine, Science, 
and Nature Medicine. 
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